

STRATEGY  
RESEARCH  
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**STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP: IT DOESN'T TAKE A BULLY**

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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## ABSTRACT

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Much has been written about leadership, managerial style, responsibility and duty. The definitions and maxims serve well to bracket the understanding of leadership and establish common ground for discussions of style, temperament and results. Many great leaders have added their views on the subject to explain who they are, and to further the development of others. The worth and importance of those who are lead; the follower, the subordinate, is not always as clearly defined in leadership studies. The case sometimes comes down to "do as I say, not as I do" when leaders' actions are examined against well established leadership principles. "It Doesn't Take a Bully" will examine temperament as it relates to leadership. This is not a study of different but equally acceptable leadership styles. It is about inappropriate and abusive behavior of the leader, regardless of his chosen style. Style is a leader's personal choice; abusive behavior is not. The alternative to dignified treatment of the led is undignified and wrong according to Army policy. The thesis is that it does not take abusive, threatening leadership to accomplish desired results. In fact the actions of a bully could actually hinder the mission.



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## STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP: IT DOESN'T TAKE A BULLY

Leadership has been defined in such brief terms as, "the influencing of others to do the leader's bidding." The study of leadership can be compared to that of religion. Religion may be defined simply as a belief in God; a short, simple, declarative statement. One must be careful, for the last word on either of these subjects has not been written. There are countless volumes, endless case studies and entire educational institutions devoted solely to these two subjects.

This treatise is not designed to add to the vast volumes on either leadership or religion. It will not set forth a single, most desired style of leadership and espouse its virtues. I will, as a ground work, present commonly used terms and definitions, styles and perceptions that are widely held. This is necessary before embarking on the tour of some thoughts on the abuses of power and authority.

Leadership is defined in FM 22-100, *Military Leadership*, as "the process of influencing others to accomplish the mission by providing purpose, direction, and motivation." It further states that "[m]otivation gives soldiers the will to do everything they are capable of doing to accomplish a mission; it causes soldiers to use their initiative when they see the need for action."<sup>1</sup>

Leadership can be direct or indirect in mode of influence. The lieutenant in charge of a platoon will have more direct influence on his soldiers than the Chief of Staff of the Army,

who would have a more indirect influence. The level of influence differs from the style of leadership. Style has often been defined as either autocratic (total control) or democratic (shared control).

"Leadership style is the personal manner and approach of leading (providing purpose, direction, and motivation). It is the way leaders directly interact with their subordinates."<sup>2</sup> A more contemporary view of leadership style is presented in FM 22-100. No longer must we assume a leader is totally autocratic or totally democratic. "There are three basic styles of military leadership—directing, delegating, and participating."<sup>3</sup>

The very directive leader is similar to the autocrat and the delegating leader closely resembles the democratic leader. The directive leader is likely to explain the 'who, what, when, where, and how' of what she desires accomplished and to closely supervise. The participating style involves the 'team' in deciding the 'what' and the 'how' of mission accomplishment. The delegating leader will give the problem solving and decision making authority to his followers.

Choosing a style of leadership is not like picking out a suit of clothes and living with that choice all day, followed by a new selection the next. It is however, predicated on certain variables much like choosing what to wear. The leader must know himself and what feels comfortable. He must also know where he is going; the situation. He must consider the task at hand—

dinner with the boss or cutting the grass. The leader must also consider the audience.

Just as one style of clothing would not be the best choice for all events and functions, neither is one extreme style of leadership the most effective in all situations and with all juniors.

A battalion commander may well deal with a newly commissioned lieutenant in charge of his first platoon, in a more directive mode than with a seasoned captain on his staff. Different levels of experience, education, age, and situational awareness are factors that influence leader style. Generals will approach their leadership responsibilities with War College graduated colonels differently than with newly selected majors.

The way a lesser educated conscript is motivated during prolonged unpopular campaigns may differ greatly from how better educated volunteers are inspired. Leaders are responsible to develop subordinates at every level of leadership. After unsuccessful attempts to modify performance, by training and mentoring subordinates, changes in methodology are warranted.

General Omar N. Bradley said; "Education makes a people easy to lead, but difficult to drive; easy to govern, but impossible to enslave."<sup>4</sup>

Regardless of the style, modes or temperament of the leader, he is still in charge and therefore responsible for the welfare of his soldiers and the success of the mission. The leader must

set forth the goals of the organization and give purpose to the effort of its members. It is the leader who is responsible for establishing a climate or environment conducive of maximum effort. So the leaders' job is to inspire, motivate, and set the course for mission success. To be the example and provide the climate for all within the organization to reach their full potential. General Omar Bradley wrote:

[N]o commander can become a strategist until he first knows his men. Far from being a handicap to command, compassion is the measure of it. For unless one values the lives of his soldiers and is tormented by their ordeals, he is unfit to command.<sup>5</sup>

Strategic leadership is the process used by a leader far removed in position and responsibilities from the direct level of influence. This is a leap from the hands on, 'management by walking around', level that the small group requires. FM 22-103 *Strategic Leadership (Draft)* provides the following definition:

Strategic leadership is the process used by a leader to affect the achievement of a desirable and clearly understood vision by influencing the organization culture, allocating resources, directing through policy and directive, and building consensus within a volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous global environment which is marked by opportunities and threats.<sup>6</sup>

Strategic leadership is distinguished by these essential elements:

1. Keenly aware of a distinctly different environment and situations it produces.
2. Transforms the political and conceptual into the practical and concrete.
3. Leverages technology, especially information technology, to enhance communications, achieve clarity, and situational awareness.

4. Fully engaged in consensus and team building and peer leadership—(cannot dictate action at this level)— co-opting, coalition building, negotiating.
5. Shapes the organization/institutional culture—sets, sustains and insures a value based organizational foundation.
6. Provides for the future—provides purpose, direction, and motivation through vision.
7. Manages change by exploiting individual and institutional capacity to learn. Creates, builds and leads 'learning organizations.'
8. Possesses a deep understanding of all levels of war and strategy and their interrelationships—practices the strategic art.

So the strategic leader must practice the art of persuasion and consensus building across a variety of stakeholders. No longer is there the option to be autocratic in the extreme in the overall leadership style. She must teach and mentor the strategic art. He must be the master of command and peer leadership inspiring others to act. She must put together cohesive teams and develop and execute strategic plans derived from the interagency process. He will be dealing with peers and seniors of the same service, sister services, other departments and other countries. Not everyone in this process reports directly through the strategic leader's chain of command.

General John A. Wickham, Jr. (Chief of Staff of the Army, June 1983—June 1987) said it this way:

To encourage creativity and innovation in the Army, we must work hard at developing a command climate in which creativity can flourish...in which honest mistakes are accepted as part of the learning process, ideas are shared, and reasonable risk-taking is encouraged..."<sup>7</sup>

"A Trained and Ready Army has as its foundation, competent and confident leaders."<sup>8</sup> The Army has traditionally been and most probably always will be a values based institution. "Honor, Integrity, Selfless Service, Courage, Loyalty, Duty and Respect" are the words used to articulate the core values of the Army.<sup>9</sup> These seven Army values will be evaluated under the heading 'character' on the new Officer Evaluation Report (DA Form 67-9, effective 1 OCT 97). While the Army's values based culture has been enduring, the words we live by have changed or been modified through the years. The word *respect* has been added to the creed by which soldiers are expected to live.

I am not suggesting that the core values of the Army change as the wind blows, but rather, the words we use to express the ethos of the Army sometimes change. The beliefs, norms, values and character of the Nation at large do evolve over time. The soldierization process must establish the creed by which soldiers shall serve. Character traits and value systems that previous generations may have taken for granted may now need to be formally reinforced.

The core values that seem to have remained rather constant in relatively recent times are; Courage, Integrity, Loyalty, Selfless Service. The same comparison of the words used to define our values depict some recent changes. FM 22-100, *Military Leadership*, (dated 31 JUL 1990), says that "four individual values that all soldiers (leaders and led) are expected to

possess are courage, candor, competence, and commitment."<sup>10</sup> The new word here is *compassion*. "Compassion is the basic respect for the dignity of each individual: treating all with dignity and respect. It is the personification of the 'Golden Rule,' treat others as you want to be treated."<sup>11</sup> FM 100-1, *The Army*, (dated 14 AUG 1994), states that "professional soldier's core qualities are commitment, competence, candor, compassion and courage."

Explicit in the definition of compassion are the words; dignity and respect. As stated earlier, the new Officer Evaluation Report will evaluate respect as it relates to the rated officer in 'promoting dignity, consideration, fairness and equal opportunity.'

This is not to suggest that values such as *dignity, respect* and *compassion* are new to the Army ethos. Nor do I suggest that previous leadership principles excluded these aspects. General John Scofield (USMA Superintendent and graduate) addressing the Corps of Cadets in 1879 said:

"The best and most successful commanders...are those who win the respect, confidence and affection of their subordinates by justice and firmness, tempered by kindness. The discipline which makes the soldiers of a free country reliable in battle is not to be gained by harsh or tyrannical treatment. On the contrary, such treatment is far more likely to destroy than to make an Army....He who feels the respect which is due to others cannot fail to inspire in them regard for himself, while he who feels, and hence manifests, disrespect toward others, especially his inferiors, cannot fail to inspire hatred against himself."<sup>12</sup>

Respect, dignified treatment, and compassion have long been valued traits of honorable people. What we may have accepted as a norm for leaders of times passed has now become policy which is formally evaluated.

In reviewing the Army's core values of dignity, respect and compassion, it is helpful to consider what several successful military leaders have had to say on these traits and leadership.

If troops are punished before their loyalty is secured they will be disobedient. If not obedient, it is difficult to employ them....Thus, command them with civility and imbue them uniformly with martial ardour and it may be said that victory is certain.<sup>13</sup>

A soldier is a man; he has rights; they must be made known to him and thereafter respected. He has ambition; it must be stirred. He has a belief in fair play; it must be honored. He has a need of comradeship; it must be supplied. He has imagination; it must be stimulated. He has a sense of personal dignity; it must be sustained. He has pride; it can be satisfied and made the bedrock of character once he is assured that he is playing a useful and respected role. He becomes loyal because loyalty has been given to him.

—General of the Army George Marshall<sup>14</sup>

Leadership in a democratic army means firmness, not harshness; understanding, not weakness; justice, not license; humanness, not intolerance; generosity, not selfishness; pride, not egotism.—General of the Army Omar N. Bradley<sup>15</sup>

The American soldier, the finest fighting soldier in the world, deserves your steady leadership, your care, your compassion, and your genuine love. You will know when you look into your soldiers' eyes, for it is there you will learn are a *TRUE* leader only when your leadership is ratified in how they judge and respect you as a leader. In the end, you the hearts of your soldiers.—General William J. Livsey, Jr.<sup>16</sup>

Perhaps the most important of the fundamentals for the military leader to realize is the deep-seated desire of every individual to maintain his self-respect and to have his right to self-respect recognized by those around him.

—Lincoln Andrews<sup>17</sup>

In [the zero defects] climate, control is the focus. Mistakes and errors still happen, but they become causes for negative sanctions: threats, reliefs, or even courts-martial. The inevitable result is that junior leaders stick to the strict letter of orders and dare not show any individual initiative....A zero defects climate creates a brittle unit, a one-person show in which the energy of the unit, is focused on pleasing the leader or at least avoiding his or her wrath, rather than on accomplishing the organizational mission. Subordinates raised in such an environment tend to perpetuate it when they take over their own units.—General Sullivan<sup>18</sup>

How concern and respect are manifested by each of us is the essence of leadership.—General Edward C. Meyer<sup>19</sup>

It doesn't take a hero to order men into battle. It takes a hero to be one of those men who goes into battle.

—General Schwarzkopf<sup>20</sup>

I'd always been taught that the responsibility of a commander is to develop his subordinates, not to relieve them...

—General Schwarzkopf<sup>21</sup>

Do I lose my temper at individuals? Am I inclined to be nice to my superiors and mean to my subordinates?—General MacArthur<sup>22</sup>

We have used the word character to modify traits or values we hold in high regard. Character is that moral inner strength in people of honor. People of honorable character adhere to principles and strive to do what is right. To do the right thing, even at great personal risk, is a desired trait in leaders. Men of weak character will change the way they view what is right and what is wrong if the cost is too high. General John A. Wickham, Jr. said; "A man of character in peace is a man of courage in war...One does not develop character in the heat of battle or a moment of crisis. Character grows out of the steady application of moral values and ethical behavior in one's life."<sup>23</sup>

If character will fail under stress or in a crisis if not soundly practiced in peace; the same may hold true of leadership. Leaders who can break with the long lingering myth that admitting they are wrong is a sign of weakness are demonstrating strong character. Leaders must be willing to admit their mistakes and never place the blame for them on others.

The defining element of who people are and what (attributes or traits) they are made of, is character. People can be either of strong or weak character. As stated earlier, there are now seven traits that make up the core values the Army expects soldiers to possess. Honor, Integrity, Courage, Loyalty, Respect, Selfless Service, and Duty, are the Army values.

Respect, the promoting of dignity, consideration, fairness and equal opportunity, is now Army policy. As we have noted from the writings and speeches of many great leaders, respect for others has always been an important element of leadership.

Military leaders have always accepted the fact subordinates had an obligation to render proper respect for their rank. What some have not realized is that the leader must demonstrate respect for the led. "Treating people with dignity and respect makes sense. It is both the right and the smart thing to do."<sup>24</sup>

General Sullivan goes on to say; "Respect—we each make our unique contribution in the armed forces, playing our parts...Respect binds our team together."<sup>25</sup> Everyone has a contribution to make and is entitled to exhibit self-worth and to

feel good about their contribution. The leader that robs a soldiers' self-worth and dignity is doing great harm. Morale, motivation, and initiative all suffer under abusive leaders. In this environment people may do just enough to get by and stay out of harm's way. They will not be the valuable advisers the senior leader requires. The strategic leader that gets poor advice or no advice has a huge problem. The best can not know or do it all.

The leader is responsible for establishing purpose, setting the direction, building the team and providing inspiration to motivate the led. All soldiers and civilians (leader and led) have needs that must be met.


One of the most famous studies of motivation as it relates to the satisfying of human needs was conducted by Abraham H. Maslow. Maslow (1943) developed a hierarchy of needs. (figure 1) The 'steps' of human needs starts off with the basic requirements for food, shelter, and clothing (nourishment and protection).

The next need is man's desire to feel secure and protected. Following physical well-being is the need for love and affection. Man has a need to belong.

After belonging comes the need to feel good about self. Self-esteem, self-respect and respect for others is a powerful need. "This is the individual's need to establish a reputation or achieve prestige....a thwarting of this need for esteem can lead to feelings of inferiority, weakness, and helplessness."<sup>26</sup>

After all other needs are met, according to Maslow, the individual can aspire to self-actualization—the crowning achievement of the hierarchy of needs. For the sake of our review self-actualization will not be discussed.

The boss shares a responsibility to assist in the satisfaction of subordinate's needs, or at a minimum does not actively hinder the process. Most want to make an acceptable contribution the goals of the organization. People have needs, not just the leader; the follower has to be satisfied also.



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The conventional wisdom on leadership attributes seems to favor dignity and respect over fear, intimidation, and threats. The quotes of leaders and writers from Sun Tzu right up to the current Chief of Staff of the Army, General Dennis Reimer, support this premise. I realize that there two sides to every discussion. Some may respond that tough, hard, straightforward commanders who make things happen are still desired.

I could not agree more. Dedicated, honorable, professional men and women who care about the people they are fortunate to lead and their mission success will always be in high demand.

I could find no 'great captains' who advocated abusive, derogatory, denigrating leader behavior. It damages morale and hinders productivity and initiative, as well as, retention. The strategic leader must have accurate, timely information. She must have advisers who will present all sides of the issue and she must provide an environment for debate. To do otherwise is to foster advisers who other dare say what the "boss" wants to hear. This is dangerous to the organization and the mission.

General Robert E. Lee, had a violent temper but took great steps to control himself. "Lee was a gentle as any warrior in history, but he was a professional soldier and a fine disciplinarian."<sup>28</sup> His subordinates were never close to him personally, yet they cared very much for him. Lee continues to be one of the most admired generals of all time.

Lieutenant Colonel Walter Herron Taylor, assistant adjutant general (equivalent of chief of staff) served with General Lee for four bitter years of war and wrote that if history were to later judge Lee was lacking as a military leader it may be that:

[Lee] was too careful of the personal feelings of his subordinate commanders, too fearful of wounding their pride, and too solicitous for their reputation....the world already knows how prone he was at all times to take upon his own shoulders the responsibility for failure or mishap, and thus shield those from censure who had really failed to execute his orders or designs.<sup>29</sup>

General Ulysses S. Grant was calm on the field of battle even in the most trying of situations. His reassuring demeanor had a calming effect on those around him.

The fact that [Grant] he never 'nagged' his officers, but treated them all with consideration, led them to communicate with him freely and intimately; and thus he gained much information which otherwise he might not have received. To have a well-disciplined command he did not deem it necessary to have an unhappy Army.<sup>30</sup>

We have many quotes from General Omar N. Bradley attesting to the virtues of caring, compassionate leadership. He is often referred to as the 'G. I. General'. Calm under fire, caring, approachable and still an extremely capable officer.

Modest and unassuming, Bradley was one of the most successful generals of World War II; while not brilliant or imaginative, he was an excellent tactician, planner, and administrator; he was known both for his calm confidence under stress and his concern for the welfare of his men. He was promoted to General of the Army in September, 1950.<sup>31</sup>

General George S. Patton, Jr. was without question, a dynamic, energetic leader with a brilliant tactical mind. History has recorded his heroic and extremely successful exploits during World War II. His numerous victories and extraordinary campaigns are legendary. Patton was also "temperamental and vain, he had not gotten along with his British colleagues and held himself above fellow Americans. Privately, [General] Eisenhower had deplored Patton's methods as 'severe and wrong', but ...would do anything not to relieve him."<sup>32</sup>

General Patton is well known for the slapping episode at a field hospital during the Sicily invasion. General Patton had

encountered a soldier in a hospital tent who was suffering from battle fatigue. He considered the soldier a coward and wanted to restore him to combat effectiveness.

There are several accounts in which Patton's actions or comments nearly caused his relief. General Eisenhower did finally, after the war ended, relieve Patton from command of Third Army. "Few generals could surpass Patton as a field commander. But he had one enemy he could not vanquish and that was his own quick tongue; wrote General Bradley.<sup>33</sup>

[C]ontridictions in Patton's character continued to bewilder his staff. For while he was profane, he was also reverent....I could not accustom myself, however, to the vulgarity with which Patton skinned offenders for relatively minor infractions in discipline....At times I felt that Patton, however successful he was as a corps commander, had not yet learned to command himself.<sup>34</sup>

This great tactical commander could have been lost to the war effort due to his lack of self-control were it not for the support of Generals Marshall, Eisenhower, and Bradley—all of whom became Generals of the Army.

"Eisenhower had counseled Patton to avoid the appearance that he acted 'on impulse and not upon study and reflection', and had offered tips like counting to ten when tempted to speak..."<sup>35</sup> Eisenhower called Patton an "operational commander—not an overall commander."<sup>36</sup>

General H. Norman Schwarzkopf is a great American hero of Persian Gulf War (Desert Storm) fame. As Commander in Chief of

U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) he "directed the largest U.S. mechanized combat operations since 1945 and won a stunning success, destroying Iraqi forces...in the space of 100 hours."<sup>37</sup> He demonstrated great care and concern for his soldiers and insisted everyone else do the same. He was extremely successful in developing and holding together a fragile coalition of over thirty-three nations. He was a gifted leader held in high regard for his competence and drive to accomplish the mission.

General Colin Powell, former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, wrote of Schwarzkopf in his autobiography. He said:

Norm Schwarzkopf, under pressure, was an active volcano....Blowing up acted as a safety valve for his frustrations. His subordinates took plenty of heat from him, yet they remained fiercely loyal.<sup>38</sup>

Powell further explained how Secretary of Defense, Richard Cheney, had expressed reservations about Schwarzkopf. Powell wrote that he understood about Schwarzkopf but that Cheney occasionally required his reassurance that the right man was in Riyadh. In relating his misgivings Cheney told Powell that Schwarzkopf had a major hold him a place in line for the restroom also he had observed a colonel on 'hands and knees' pressing a uniform for Schwarzkopf.<sup>39</sup>

Schwarzkopf is considered by many, a man of profound intellect and also of profane intimidation of his subordinates. He is a man of high capacity, high energy and high terror. General Carl E. Vuono, former Chief of Staff of the Army, when

asked to describe Schwarzkopf, said: "Competent, compassionate, egotistical, loyal, opinionated, funny, emotional, sensitive to any slight. At times he can be an overbearing bastard, but not with me."<sup>40</sup>

In his book, *The Commanders*, Bob Woodward says; [Schwarzkopf] "was a terror as a boss, often furious when unhappy or dissatisfied, infamous for shooting the messengers who brought bad news."<sup>41</sup> In *The General's War*, General Trainor says:

Schwarzkopf's violent temper became well known in the Army as he made his way up the ladder to senior rank....there was no doubt that [he] terrorized some of his subordinates, who never knew what would set him off or when it would happen... To his admirers, Schwarzkopf was a warrior. To his detractors, and there were many, he was a bully, who commanded through intimidation and was eager to grab the credit that belonged to others.<sup>42</sup>

Schwarzkopf, a man of enormous talents and great successes, like Patton before him, appears unable or unwilling to command himself. Between August 1990 and February 1991, he

"[O]bliquely or directly...threatened to relieve or court[s]-martial his senior ground commander, his naval commander, his air commanders, and both Army corps commanders, Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney had worried sufficiently about Schwarzkopf's temper and his yen for imperial trappings to consider the possibility of replacing him."<sup>43</sup>

[Schwarzkopf's] headquarters, swept with his verbal grapeshot month after month, became a dispirited bunker, where initiative withered and even senior generals hesitated to bring him unpleasant tidings. Instead, when the tirades began they sat with eyes glassy and averted in what came to be called the 'stunned mullet look' until his fury spent itself.<sup>44</sup>

He was revered, and rightly so, by the soldiers in the field. He was legendary in ensuring the welfare of the troops. It was not so with his staff.

The CINC could excoriate younger officer. (One group of majors and lieutenant colonels kept count of how many general's stars had been in the room at the moment of their greatest humiliation by Schwarzkopf; the 'winner' claimed twenty-two.) But Schwarzkopf's hottest fire was saved for the generals themselves, particularly those he deemed insufficiently aggressive...<sup>45</sup>

"Lieutenant General John Yeosock, the senior Army commander, was so frequently berated that he seemed reluctant [to attend] the daily CENTCOM [Central Command] meetings. Again, the public upbraiding of a senior officer-considered bad form-bred contempt among subordinates."<sup>46</sup>

The senior British officer in the Persian Gulf War coalition, General Sir Peter de la Billi`ere, says of Schwarzkopf:

"Like everyone else, he had his failings, among them the quick temper which gave him his nickname, Stormin Norman. He could certainly flare up-or, as his staff described it, 'go ballistic'-and when he did so, he became very frightening."<sup>47</sup>

General Billi`ere further wrote in his book *Storm Command*: I sometimes felt that the storms were controlled and deliberate, laid on to keep people sharpened up, but I also reckoned that his short fuse tended to stilt his staff officers. His immediate staff respected him-everyone did-but they were also frightened of him, and reluctant to take decisions unless he backed them, with the result that he lost some imput from them.<sup>48</sup>

Atkinson writes: those who worked closest with him, however, including [LTG] Waller..., thought the rages immature and dysfunctional....Waller worried that he was creating a band of yes-men; several times the DCINC urged him to be more gracious and to encourage debate.<sup>49</sup>

General Powell says: "For all his pyrotechnics and histrionics, however, Norm was a brilliant officer, a born leader, and a skilled diplomat in the region."<sup>50</sup>

In his book, Schwarzkopf describes taking over a battalion that his predecessor referred to as a 'lousy battalion with lousy morale.' It was December 11, 1969 and the unit was 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry, 198th Infantry Brigade, 23d Infantry Division (Americical) located near Chu Lai, South Vietnam. He tells of the lack of discipline and poor morale of the troops assigned to his battalion.

I had to be a complete son of a bitch to get any results, which often entailed losing my temper five or six times in a day. Being calm and reasonable just didn't work. For one thing the antiwar protest were mounting in the United States and a lot of our draftees knew they'd been sent to an unpopular war and didn't want to fight.<sup>51</sup>

But this story was in 1969, with a different war, a different Army with different leaders who had different professional training. I think Atkinson sums it up very well when he writes:

[Schwarzkopf and his generals of Desert Storm had] been junior officers in Southeast Asia, forever seared by the war and the hard peace that followed. They had stayed the course after Vietnam, vowing to restore honor and competence to the American profession of arms and, most important, to renew the bond between the Republic and its soldiery. This Safwan, March 3, 1991 [Persian Gulf War cease fire meeting with Iraqi representatives]-was their vindication. For Norman Schwarzkopf and his lieutenants, this war had lasted not six weeks, but twenty years.<sup>52</sup>

Schwarzkopf "was not unaware of his shortcomings, including the temper, which he once described as 'without question my major weakness as a commander.'"<sup>53</sup> However,... "he prudently spared the

allies his wrath. Here he showed himself most competent at that for which he was presumed least prepared by training and constitution: the muster and mastery of a huge coalition drawn from three dozen nations.<sup>54</sup> It would appear that when he deemed it important, he could exercise self-command. Schwarzkopf commented in an interview that "I have always regretted that I have such a harsh temper, but because I care so much about soldiers I don't want to accept second best."

Sun Tzu wrote: That one of the five dangerous qualities in the character of a general is; "If quick-tempered you can make a fool of him;...An impulsive man can be provoked to rage and brought to his death."<sup>55</sup>

It is not about style. Those in leadership positions must adopt their own style. They will be guided by their own personality and value system; their beliefs and norms. Many other variables will effect where on the style continuum the leader functions at different times. The mission, situation, resources and the people who must be influenced all have a bearing on the leader's style.

It goes without saying that leaders in a basic training post will employ different approaches then a leader in an interagency or country team environment. But one thing remains constant, they all deserve to be treated with dignity and respect. The trainee may find herself in a totally autocratic leader camp,

while the embassy staff may be in a democratic, coalition building situation.

The leader should and does have great latitude to develop a leadership style that is effective and comfortable for him. She does not have the same latitude to denigrate and abuse the very people she is charged to protect. This is not to advocate a kind, gentle, benevolent manager. Leadership is a demanding, aggressive, results producing business. It is wrong to equate abuse to style and effectiveness. Fear is not the best motivation.

According to *Webster's New World Dictionary and Thesaurus*; a bully is "a person who hurts or browbeats those who are weaker."<sup>56</sup> The dictionary defines care as; "close attention, heed,...charge, protection, responsibility,...to look after; provide for."<sup>57</sup> Given the choice of being browbeaten or protected, I believe the majority would opt for protection.

Strategic leadership requires the care and concern to build up the individual, as well as, the coalition. It requires an ability to develop consensus among many organizations and agencies, with many different reporting structures. Consensus building through fear is group think by intimidation. The advice the bully receives is the advice he demands. There is no debate of options and courses of action in this environment.

The important thing is that private or administrative assistant, general or ambassador, people are vitally important to

the success of any mission. They deserve leaders who understand the psychology of human nature. You simply get more, better, sooner, easier and in a heck of a better climate if you just plain treat others the way you want to be treated.

Leaders pick their style; followers respond or fail to be influenced. The pragmatic approach is to concern yourself with people and they will return to you ten-fold. Threaten, abuse and intimidate and people will learn to cope but they will not take risk or develop initiative that may bring down the wrath of the boss.

The institution having established the principles; policies, norms and values, upon which it will function and by which it will be evaluated must promote those principles. Once the expectations are known and institutionalized they must be enforced or they become meaningless. It becomes another 'do as I say, not as I do' situation that can breed contempt for all the values espoused.

Rightly so, the members get to question why are these the standards for some but not for others? Do we want to establish another level of participation wherein the more 'worth' one brings to the organization the more she can choose which principles govern her behavior?

If leaders can pick the values, as if from a menu, that appeal to them, then there is no standard. Our value system becomes an 'if you want to' set of 'guidelines' to be devalued or

defined as the senior leader decides. That is no longer a values based organization, but one of confusion and arbitrary and therefore unfair standards.

If we see problems in our organization we are obliged to correct them. Developing subordinates is a critical part of a leader's job. Part of belonging to a profession is the mentoring and policing of the 'licensing' qualifications that govern that profession.

The Army has decided it should be a great place to serve and 'Be all you can be.' It can and should support and evaluate adherence to its character traits identifying the values on which it is based. Throughout the leader development process the Army can and should assess its leader's identity with the institutional values. The officer coming up short should be provided the support, training, counseling, and education to assist in correctly aliening behavior with the Army ethos. Should that effort prove unsuccessful then the evaluation must be rendered that effectively tells the Army it has policed its profession and effectively telling the offending officer that she failed to make the desired adjustment in behavior deemed contrary to the Army values. These values are conditions of employment. Anything else and the members get to pick from the menu of values and character traits, those that more nearly conform to how they see things—to what their needs are—ignoring that the Army and

its soldiers have a rightful expectation that their needs will also be met.

Who wins, the offending officer, or the organization she has sworn to serve? Leaders have no right to denigrate subordinates. It may make the commander feel good and meet her 'needs' but it sure harms the member's relationship to organization.

Treating the most valuable asset any organization has—its people—with compassion, dignity, and respect simply makes sense. It is a sound business principle. It works; it's pragmatic. It is Army policy.

Word Count 5,777

## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> U.S. Department of the Army. Field Manual 22-100: Military Leadership. (Washington, DC: 31 July 1990), 1.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., 69.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> Robert A. Fitton, editor. Leadership: Quotations from the Military Tradition (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), 148.

<sup>5</sup> Omar N. Bradley, A Soldier's Story (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1951), 310.

<sup>6</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 22-103: Strategic Leadership (Draft) (Washington, DC:), 1.

<sup>7</sup> Edward C. Meyer, et. al., The Chiefs of Staff, United States Army: On Leadership and the Profession of Arms (Washington, DC: Pentagon, Information Management Support Center, 1997), 28.

<sup>8</sup> FM 22-100: Military Leadership, i.

<sup>9</sup> Togo D. West, Jr., and General Dennis J. Reimer, A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army Fiscal Year 1998 (Washington, D.C.: 1997), 49.

<sup>10</sup> Field Manual 22-100: Military Leadership (Washington, D.C.: 31 July 1990), 23.

<sup>11</sup> Field Manual 100-1: The Army (Washington, D.C.: 14 August 1994), 1.

<sup>12</sup> Colonel (ret) Larry R. Donnithorne, The West Point Way of Leadership (New York: Doubleday, 1994), 174.

<sup>13</sup> Sun Tzu, Sun Pin, The Complete Art of War (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), 122-23.

<sup>14</sup> Meyer, Edward, et. al., 59.

<sup>15</sup> Fitton, 148.

<sup>16</sup> John G. Meyer, Jr., Company Command the Bottom Line (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1990), XXV

<sup>17</sup> Donnithorne, 176.

<sup>18</sup> Meyer, Edward, et. al., 75.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., 10.

<sup>20</sup> H. Norman Schwarzkopf, It Doesn't Take A Hero: General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, the Autobiography, Written with Peter Petre (New York: Bantam Books, 1992), XIII.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., 162.

<sup>22</sup> Donnithorne, 178-79.

<sup>23</sup> Meyer, Edward, et.al., 23.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., 79.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> Colonel Samuel H. Hays, and Lt. Col William N. Thomas, Taking Command (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1967), 170-71.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> Henry Steel Commanger, editor, The Blue and the Gray New York: Crescent Books, 1950), 513.

<sup>29</sup> Walter H. Taylor, Four Years With General Lee (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1996), 2.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

<sup>31</sup> Trevor N. Dupuy, Curt Johnson, and David L Bongard, The Harper Encyclopedia of Military Biography (Edison, NJ: Castle Books, 1995), 101.

<sup>32</sup> David Eisenhower, Eisenhower at War 1943-1945, (New York: Random House, 1986), 37.

<sup>33</sup> Bradley, 231.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., 52.

<sup>35</sup> Eisenhower, 128.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., 401.

<sup>37</sup> Dupuy, et. al., 666.

<sup>38</sup> Colin L. Powell, My American Journey: An Autobiography (New York: Random House, 1995), 478.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., 479.

<sup>40</sup> Rick Atkinson, Crusade (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1993), 73.

<sup>41</sup> Bob Woodward, The Commanders (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), 208.

<sup>42</sup> Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The General's War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (Boston: Little, Brown, 1994), 41.

<sup>43</sup> Atkinson, 3.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid., 3-4.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., 69.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid.

<sup>47</sup> General Sir Peter de la Billière, Storm Command (London: Motivate Publishing, 1992), 40.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid.

<sup>49</sup> Atkinson, 71.

<sup>50</sup> Powell, 479.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid., 159.

<sup>52</sup> Atkinson, 2.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid., 71.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid., 72.

<sup>55</sup> Sun Tzu, 114.

<sup>56</sup> Michael Agnes, editor in chief, Webster's New World Dictionary and Thesaurus, (New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1996), 77.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid., 88.

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